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Abstract
This paper examines interbrand competition between a domestic and a
foreign manufacturer who market their products through intermediaries.
The contracts manufacturers offer these intermediaries are endogenous.
In equilibrium contracts may specify exclusive territories (ET), depending
on the degree of substitutability between products and the level and
degree of transparency of trade barriers. Trade liberalization, through
lower or more transparent barriers, may lead manufacturers to use ET,
thereby substituting private anti-competitive arrangements for government-
imposed barriers. This substitution may decrease competition and
welfare, and thus create a role for competition policy in a freer trade
environment.
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The trade literature typically assumes that exporters sell directly to consumers. Throughout
history, however, intermediaries have played an important role in international exchange.
Greif (1993), for instance, analyzes in detail the complex relations between merchants and
their overseas agents in the 11th-century Mediterranean economy [see Peng (1998) for an
account since 1600]. In his analysis of retail trade in England between 1550 and 1700, Berger
(1980) notes that during that time retailers assumed an important role in the distribution
of internationally traded goods.
Reliable data about the share of trade handled by intermediaries is hard to come by. In
the early 1990s, Japan’s trading companies handled 40% of Japanese exports according to
the Economist (1995), while US export management companies handled about 10% of US
manufactured exports according to Root (1994). However, these shares do not capture all
the intermediaries operating in international markets. More broadly, Rauch (1999) estimates
that in 1990 about 65% of international trade was in di¤erentiated products for which there
were no organized exchanges or reference prices (up from 55% in 1970). It is mainly with
respect to these products that intermediaries can be expected to play an important role. Not
only do intermediaries match international buyers and sellers, they typically also provide a
variety of services ranging fromproviding information about markets and competing products
to foreign manufacturers, to providing pre- or after-sale services to local consumers. The
increasing role of intermediaries is also consistent with the general trend of export service
outsourcing.
The relationship between manufacturers and intermediaries, however, is not without
problems. For instance, it is well known that in imperfectly competitive markets successive
markups by manufacturers and intermediaries (double marginalization) create ine¢ciencies
within the vertical structure. The inability of manufacturers to observe their intermediaries’
sales e¤ort may create moral hazard problems. And the presence of market uncertainty may
lead to a problem of allocating risk between parties with di¤erent degrees of risk aversion. To
deal with such problems, manufacturers and intermediaries typically write contracts. Such
1contracts are known as vertical restraints.
The potential use of these contracts raises interesting questions in the context of interna-
tional trade. For instance, what contracts do foreign and domestic manufacturers o¤er their
local intermediaries? Do they use di¤erent contracts? Do changes in protection encourage
or discourage the use of certain vertical restraints by domestic or foreign …rms? Does this in-
crease or reduce competition? What are the e¤ects on welfare? Since some vertical restraints
are known to impede competition, is there a role for competition policy at the national or
at the international level in restricting their use? This list of questions is, of course, not
exhaustive. The point is that we know very little about contracting problems in interna-
tional trade and about how the choice of contract interacts with trade policy. This paper
represents an attempt at investigating some of these questions. The main message of the
paper is that it is potentially important to consider contractual arrangements when assessing
the e¤ects of trade liberalization. In particular, we show that, as trade policy changes, the
vertical contractual arrangements themselves may change with strong implications for trade
volume, competition and welfare.
There has recently been considerable speculation in policy circles on both sides of the
Atlantic about the role of vertical restraints in international trade. For instance, the Euro-
pean Commissioners in charge of trade and competition policy have asserted that: “[..] the
incentive for …rms to engage in anti-competitive behavior impeding market access (such as
[..] vertical restraints) increases with the reduction of tari¤s and other barriers” (Brittan
and Van Miert (1996, p.4)). In a similar vein, Debra Valentine (1997), the Assistant Director
of the International Antitrust Division at the U.S. Federal Trade Commission, has argued
that: “... as government barriers to market integration disappear, we can expect that private
anticompetitive practices will assume increased importance. And vertical restrictions will be
an important and complicated issue for competition enforcers.” By endogenizing the use of
vertical restraints, this paper is able to investigate whether there is any validity to these
speculations.1
1In November 1997, the US Department of Justice established the International Competition Policy
2The vertical restraint we focus on is an exclusive territory (ET) clause, which implies
that a manufacturer uses an exclusive intermediary (hereafter called a retailer) in a given
country or region. There are at least two reasons why ET is an interesting vertical restraint
to examine in an international context. First, it is the area of ET where the United States
and the European Union (EU) di¤er the most in their anti-trust policies. In the United
States, vertical restraints—and especially ET—are viewed as essentially e¢cient and thus
harmless; the main argument is that they alleviate free riding among retailers in the provision
of customer services. The opposite is true in Europe. At least until recently, the EU saw
ET as anti-competitive and as restricting trade, thereby undermining the forces of economic
integration, especially when the exclusive territories correspond to member countries.2 It is
thus the role of international trade and economic integration that di¤erentiates the United
States and the EU as far as the treatment of ET is concerned.3 Second, the enforcement
of an ET clause, which requires a suppression of intrabrand competition across assigned
territories, appears to be relatively easy at the international level. As Gallini and Hollis
(1999) have pointed out, there exist a variety of legal tools, such as trademark and copyright
laws, that help prevent this type of competition, e.g. by excluding parallel imports. So if
manufacturers …nd it in their interest to use ET internationally, there would seem to be little
that would stand in their way.
In our model the choice of ET is determined by the following trade-o¤. The bene…t of
adopting ET is that it helps reduce interbrand competition between domestic and foreign
manufacturers. The cost of an ET contract is that it exposes risk-averse retailers to the
Advisory Committee (ICPAC) in large part to examine the “interface of international trade and competition
policy.” The reason given for this mandate is that: “As many formal barriers to trade have been reduced
or eliminated around the world, international policy attention is focusing increasingly on the role of private
anticompetitive practices of …rms.” (www.usdoj.gov/atr/icpac/icpac.htm).
2The recent EU Green Paper on Vertical Restraints in EC Competition Policy suggests a change in policy
that would move the EU closer to the U.S. position [EU (1998)].
3This role, however, is still not very well understood. As Deacon (1995) acknowledges when he writes
about Europe, the “partially complete nature of the internal market has never been satisfactorily analyzed
in the economic literature (in particular with respect to territorial exclusivity provisions) [..].”
3uncertainties associated with international trade. A key source of these uncertainties, apart
from exchange-rate ‡uctuations, is the seemingly random nature of many trade barriers. By
this we mean that many policies are su¢ciently obscure in their interpretation, or arbitrary
in their application so as to make the true cost of imports highly uncertain. Examples of
such policies in Japan, Korea, the EU and the United States (listed in Appendix 1) show
that these barriers are not simply trading costs easily captured by well-de…ned taxes. Rather
they involve resource costs, and they have a high element of arbitrariness and uncertainty
about them, because policies and regulations are purposely vague, ambiguous and left open
to interpretation. In short, uncertainty is built in, whether through antidumping or coun-
tervailing duty investigations, changes in tari¤ classi…cation, ‘administrative punishment’
for mistakes about custom procedures, or the design and application of industry or health
standards, product certi…cation, entry authorizations, advertising and labeling standards,
especially when these standards are under the control of industry associations. In the case
of Japan, their randomness is best exempli…ed by this quote: “[..] gaining access in Japan
is an experience not unlike attaining justice in Franz Kafka’s novel The Trial”( c i t e db y
Saxonhouse (1993)).
Trade policy is shown in this paper to have non-trivial e¤ects on the trade-o¤ between
reducing price competition and insuring retailers, and hence on the equilibrium choice of ET.
In particular, we identify conditions under which trade liberalization leads to an increased
use of ET in equilibrium, and other conditions under which it induces manufacturers to stop
using ET. In the former case, manufacturers counteract a reduction in government barriers
to trade with a private anti-competitive arrangement. We also demonstrate that this private
arrangement, namely ET, may have worse e¤ects than the initial government barrier so that
interbrand competition, trade volume and welfare may decrease with trade liberalization.
The paper hence identi…es circumstances under which competition policy, when it prohibits
ET, may have a clear role to play in a freer trade environment.
This paper is linked to the literature in the following way. To the best of our knowledge,
Fargeix and Perlo¤ (1989) is the …rst trade paper in which a manufacturer (in their case only
4the domestic one) sells through an agent. They are interested in how trade liberalization
a¤ects this agent’s incentive to provide customer services, and hence treat contracts as
exogenous.4 Although there are many recent books and papers about the role of competition
policy in international markets, most deal with mergers and cartels rather than with vertical
restraints.5 The present paper is, however, closely linked to the literature in Industrial
Organization on vertical restraints. This is especially the case with respect to Rey and
Tirole’s (1986) classic paper on endogenous vertical restraints, and Rey and Stiglitz’s (1995)
paper on the anti-competitive e¤ect of ET.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we build a model with
one domestic and one foreign manufacturer. In Section 3, we …rst derive the equilibrium
prices, outputs and pro…ts for each combination of contracts selected by the two manufac-
turers, and then show that interbrand competition generally decreases with the use of ET.
In Section 4, we derive the equilibrium choice of contracts given the exogenous parameters of
the model. In Section 5, we use simulations to investigate the e¤ects of trade liberalization
on the equilibrium choice of contracts, the volume of trade and on welfare. We also discuss
the role of competition policy. Section 6 provides extensions, and Section 7 concludes.
2 The Model
Consider a domestic manufacturer (h) and a foreign manufacturer (f) who produce imper-




i(pi;p j);i ; j = h;f; j 6 =i; (1)
4Another recent paper in which manufacturers use agents is Richardson (1999b). But in this paper, too,
contracts are exogenous.
5Bhagwati and Hudec (1996) recently edited two volumes on a variety of issues linked to the harmoniza-
tion of policies, including competition policy. Recent papers more speci…cally on international aspects of
competition policy include Francois and Horn (1998), Head and Ries (1997), Horn and Levinsohn (1997),
Levinsohn (1994), Motta and Onida (1997), Nagaoka (1998) and Richardson (1999a).
5where pi denotes the consumer price of product i. De…ning Di
i (and Di
j) as the partial
derivatives with respect to price pi (respectively pj), we make standard assumptions such
as Di
i < 0, Di




¯ ¯ ¯. F u r t h e r m o r e ,w ea s s u m et h a tDi
ii · 0, Di





¯ ¯ ¯. The assumptions on the second derivatives (as is shown in Appendix 2) assure
strategic complementarity of prices.
The production technology exhibits constant marginal costs. We denote manufacturer i’s
marginal cost by ci, i = h;f: To distribute their products to consumers both manufacturers
require the services of intermediaries. In keeping with tradition, we refer to these intermedi-
aries as retailers, even though their activities may also cover other distribution stages. We
assume that there are many competitive retailers serving the home market and that the
retail activity itself is costless. Under ET, a manufacturer picks one of these retailers to
be his exclusive agent;6 we refer to the home (foreign) manufacturer’s exclusive retailer as
retailer h (f). We assume that manufacturers can commit themselves to assign ET and that
this choice, once made, is observed by all …rms.
In addition to the wholesale price, retailers potentially face a cost arising from trade
barriers. This cost is represented by a random variable t a n dm e a s u r e di np e r - u n i tt e r m s .
We treat it as a resource cost incurred by the retailers.7 It is common knowledge for all agents
in the economy that t is distributed over the interval [t¡;t +] with mean te and variance ¾2
t.
Both manufacturers and retailers face uncertainty about t at the contracting stage, but
retailers later observe the realization of t before choosing what price to charge consumers.
The variance ¾2
t can be interpreted as the degree of uncertainty of the trade barrier.
In this paper, we limit the choice of contracts to ‘ET’ and ‘no ET’. To make sure that
manufacturers cannot discriminate among retailers or propose other contractual arrange-
ments (e.g. retail price maintenance), we follow Rey and Tirole (1986) and Rey and Stiglitz
6Alternatively, we could assume that the home market is divided into a …nite number of ‘territories’, such
as federal states or metropolitan areas, and that each ‘territory’ has a large number of competitive retailers.
This would have no e¤ect on our results.
7Our welfare conclusions would not be a¤ected in any qualitatively important way, if we were to treat t
as a revenue-generating tari¤.
6(1995) in assuming that manufacturers observe only the amount supplied to retailers and
whether a given retailer carries a product, but do not observe the quantity sold by the retail-
ers, their pro…t and retail prices. Moreover, the manufacturers cannot refuse to deal ex post.
They can, however, set a franchise fee, since manufacturers observe whether the product is
carried by a retailer. Hence, a contract always speci…es a wholesale price wi and a franchise
fee Fi (i = h;f).8 Complicating the choice of contract in this uncertain trade environment is
the fact that, while manufacturers themselves are risk neutral, retailers are risk averse. For
analytical tractability, we assume that retailers are extremely risk averse; what this implies
will be discussed below.
The assumption that the realization of t is not observed by the manufacturers is impor-
tant: it implies that manufacturers cannot specify contracts conditional on the realization
of t. They hence have no direct (i.e. contractual) means of insuring retailers. The non-
transparent barriers listed in Appendix 1 …t this assumption. These barriers are typically
product-speci…c and, insofar as retailers (or wholesalers) act as importers of the foreign prod-
ucts they sell, manufacturers have no reason to know the realization of t before the products
are actually sold.9
The strategic interactions between the manufacturers and between them and their retail-
ers can be summarized by a three-stage game. In the …rst stage, each manufacturer chooses
which contract to have with its retailer(s). Manufacturers have two options: assign ET to
their retailers or, alternatively, sell to retailers without such a clause. In the second stage,
manufacturers choose their wholesale prices and franchise fees given the option chosen in
the …rst stage. In the third stage, retailers learn the realization of t and choose their retail
8Rey and Stiglitz (1995) show that ET, in itself, does not require a franchise fee. However, they demon-
strate that it is a dominant strategy for the manufacturers to adopt such a franchise fee along with ET and
thus we consider this case only.
9What is important for our results is that manufacturers cannot write complete insurance contracts.
Exchange-rate movements, which otherwise act in a similar way as changes in trade barriers (see Feenstra
(1989)), do not …t our interpretation of t, at least to the extent that it is possible to perfectly hedge against
such movements.
7prices accordingly. Consumers then make their purchase decisions. In the next two sections,
we characterize the subgame-perfect equilibria of this game.
3 The Role of Rivalry and Uncertainty
3.1 The choice of retail prices
Consider …rst the economic choices at the retail stage. Retailers face two potential types of
competition, intrabrand competition from other retailers representing the same manufacturer
and interbrand competition from retailers selling the other manufacturer’s product. The
degree of inter- and intrabrand competition, as we shall see, depends on the manufacturers’
choice of contract. If a manufacturer does not use ET, intrabrand competition among his
retailers leads them to adopt marginal-cost pricing, and drives their pro…t to zero. The
retail price of the product supplied by the manufacturer under no ET is simply ph = wh or
pf = wf + t; depending on whether the manufacturer is domestic or foreign.




(pi ¡ wi ¡ ti)D
i(pi;p j) ¡ F
i; (2)
where tf = t and th =0 . The …rst-order condition to this problem is
D
i(pi;p j)+( pi ¡ wi ¡ ti)D
i
i(pi;p j)=0 : (3)
This condition implicitly de…nes retailer i’s best-response function, which we write as pi =
Ri(pj;w i;t i): Given our assumptions about the demand function, it is straightforward to
verify that @Ri=@pj > 0, @Ri=@wi > 0 and @Ri=@ti > 0: That is, the best-response function
is upward sloping, and i’s price response is increasing in his wholesale price and the trade
barrier he faces.
There are four possible sets of equilibrium retail prices, depending on each manufacturer’s
choice of contract. As we have already seen, retailer i’s price when manufacturer i does not
impose ET is pi = wi + ti regardless of j’s choice. If manufacturer i uses ET but j does
8not, then retailer i’s equilibrium price is obtained by using pj = wj + tj in (3). If both
manufacturers have chosen ET, (3) de…nes a pair of best-response functions for retailers i
and j, and the equilibrium retail prices are obtained by solving this system. Below, we will
write retailer i’s price as pi(wi;w j;t) for i = h;f, where it is implicitly understood that this
price also depends on the contracts chosen by the two manufacturers.
The fact that retailers are risk averse has no e¤ect on their choice of price, since this
choice comes after they have observed the realization of t. But it may a¤ect their decision of
whether to represent a manufacturer, since this choice is made before they learn the value of t.
We have to distinguish between two cases depending on whether the manufacturer uses ET.
If he does not use it, then intrabrand competition guarantees that the retailers representing
this manufacturer earn zero pro…ts for every realization of t—they simply pass on any cost
to the consumer. In order for the retailers to be willing to represent the manufacturer in
this case the franchise fee must be zero.
If the manufacturer imposes ET, he exposes his exclusive retailer to risk. Ex post, the
realization of t is only observed by the retailer. This means that the manufacturer cannot
make the franchise fee and the wholesale price contingent on the realized value of t.T h e
retailer’s ex-post pro…t therefore varies with this value, and he must be compensated for
taking on the associated risk if he is to accept the manufacturer’s contract. The assumption
of extreme risk aversion allows us to capture this compensation, or risk premium, in an
analytically tractable way.10 In particular, this assumption implies that the retailer only
accepts the manufacturer’s contract, if doing so leaves him with a non-negative pro…t under
the “worst” realization of t.
Letting tv
i denote the worst possible realization of t for retailer i = h;f,i ti se a s i l ys h o w n
that tv
f = t+ and tv
h = t¡.11 Using (2), we then observe that under ET the highest franchise
10Our results only depend on the fact that under ET a manufacturer must pay his retailer a risk premium,
and not on the speci…c form that this risk premium takes under the assumption of extreme risk aversion.
11To see this consider the worst realization of t for retailer f; assuming that wholesale prices and the
franchise fee are given. If h does not have ET, an increase in t raises retailer f’s cost but leaves ph and
the residual demand for f’s product unchanged; so the higher is t, the lower is retailer f’s pro…t. If h has
9fee the manufacturer is able to charge (assuming that the retailer’s payo¤ from his best














where If =1and Ih =0 .
3.2 The choice of wholesale prices
Consider now the manufacturers’ choice of wholesale prices. We start with the case where
both have chosen ET. Manufacturer i’s problem is to …nd the wi that maximizes his expected
pro…t, which consists of his expected wholesale pro…t and the franchise fee. To simplify
the analysis, we assume that expected demand satis…es EtDi (pi(wi;w j;t);p j(wi;w j;t)) =
Di (pi(wi;w j;t e);p j(wi;w j;t e)),a sw o u l d ,f o ri n s t a n c e ,b et h ec a s ei fd e m a n dw e r el i n e a r . 12
































w h e r ew eh a v es i m p l i … e dt h en o t a t i o nb yu s i n gDi(te) ´ Di (pi(wi;w j;t e);p j(wi;w j;t e)),
pi(te) ´ pi(wi;w j;t e),a n dFi(tv
i) ´ Fi(wi;w j;t v
i). Applying the envelope theorem, we can
ET, any increase in pf in response to a rise in t will be accompanied by an increase in ph;t h i sf o l l o w sf r o m
the strategic complementarity of retail prices. However, since dph=dpf < 1 (see Appendix 2), ph will rise
be less than pf and so demand for good f must fall. In addition, note that when manufacturer f uses ET,
@pf=@t < 1 (see Appendix 2). This together with falling demand means that retailer f’s pro…t is decreasing
in t.Af a l li nt a¤ects retailer h indirectly via a decrease in pf.Al o w e rpf leads to lower residual demand
for good h and a smaller pro…t for retailer h.
12More generally this holds whenever t enters expected demand with an exponent of one.

















Using (7) in (6) gives:
(Di(te) ¡ Di(tv




















This …rst-order condition illustrates three important e¤ects of the choice of wi,n a m e l y
an insurance, a direct and a strategic e¤ect. The …rst term (in parentheses) represents the
insurance e¤ect. An increase in wi raises pro…t from wholesaling at rate Di(te). However,
it also increases the cost of the retailer and thus decreases the manufacturer’s pro…t from
the franchise fee at rate Di(tv
i); where Di(tv
i) · Di(te). Intuitively, raising wi is bene…cial
since it helps transfer some of the risk from the risk-averse retailer to the risk-neutral man-
ufacturer.14 The second term is the standard direct e¤ect of wi on wholesale pro…t. The
third term (in square brackets) is the total strategic e¤ect: an increase in wi raises pj,s i n c e
@pj=@wi =( dpj=dpi)(@pi=@wi) > 0, and hence indirectly the residual demand for good i by
Di
j(¢)(@pj(¢)=@wi). A unit increase in residual demand raises the wholesale pro…t by (wi¡ci)
and the franchise fee by (pi(tv
i) ¡ wi ¡ Iitv
i).
Best-reply function (8) together with its counterpart for manufacturer j de…nes the equi-
librium wholesale prices when both manufacturers have chosen ET. If manufacturer i does
not use ET but j does, i’s retailers are fully insured through intrabrand competition, but he


















which is identical to (6) except that @Fi=@wi =0 : Manufacturer j’s …rst-order condition
changes, too. He still levies a franchise fee, but no longer realizes a strategic e¤ect since i’s
13We can use the envelope theorem here, since in a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium a retailer’s choice
of price must be a best response in all subgames following the move of nature, which picks t 2 [t¡;t +]; tv
i is
one of nature’s possible choices.
14If the retailer were risk neutral, Di(tv
i) would be equal to Di(te):

















which is the same as (8), except that the strategic e¤ect has disappeared (and i has been
replaced with j). Hence when one manufacturer chooses ET and the other does not, equi-
librium wholesale prices are de…ned by (9) and (10).
If both manufacturers choose ‘no ET’, the e¤ect from the franchise fee and the strategic
e¤ect disappear from (8), leaving
D
i(t







Equilibrium wholesale prices are then given by the system of equations (11).
Below it will prove convenient to denote a contract choice by a single letter: E for
‘ET’ and N for ‘no ET’. A pair of contract choices can then be written as (E;E); (E;N);
(N;E) or (N;N), where the …rst letter refers to the domestic manufacturer’s contract. We
denote the equilibrium wholesale prices and corresponding manufacturer pro…ts in the four









j ;t e;t v
i;t v
j),w h e r ei;j = h;f and k;l = E;N.
In the next section we ask how the choice of wholesale prices a¤ects retail prices and thus
the degree of interbrand competition across the di¤erent contract scenarios.
3.3 Contracts and interbrand competition
We know from Rey and Stiglitz (1995) that in the absence of uncertainty and with two
symmetric manufacturers the simultaneous adoption of ET by both leads to higher retail
prices. For the purpose of the current paper, however, it is important to generalize this result
in three directions, namely by allowing for cost asymmetries between …rms, uncertainty and
risk-averse retailers, and asymmetries in the contract choice. The following proposition is
proved formally in Appendix 3:
12Proposition 1 (a) The use of ET by one or both manufacturers leads to higher expected
equilibrium retail prices than in the case where no one uses ET. (b)I fjtv ¡ tej is su¢ciently
small, moving from a situation where only one manufacturer uses ET to one where both use
ET raises expected equilibrium retail prices.
What is the intuition for these results? Consider …rst part (a). Suppose manufacturer
j adopts ET. This frees up the link between his wholesale price and the price choice of his
retailer. Manufacturer i (who does not have ET) now realizes that if he raises the wholesale
price and hence the retail price of his product, j’s retailer will respond by raising his price as
well; this is the strategic e¤ect given by the last term of (9). Hence for any wholesale price
set by j, i chooses a higher wholesale price than before, leading to a higher retail price for
both products.
When switching to ET, manufacturer j encounters a double-marginalization problem.
He can alleviate this problem by decreasing wj and using the franchise fee to capture the
pro…t of his exclusive retailer. In particular, retail price pj would be the same as in the
absence of ET, if wj were set equal to marginal cost cj. However, j …nds it optimal to set
wj >c j, since a higher wholesale price provides at least some insurance for the retailer (this
can be formally seen by noticing that the …rst term in (10) is positive). This e¤ect implies
that, ceteris paribus, j’s exclusive retailer does increase his retail price when manufacturer
j adopts ET. Together with the strategic e¤ect for manufacturer i, this means that the
equilibrium expected retail prices necessarily increase when one manufacturer adopts ET.
If both manufacturers switch from no ET to ET, then both can exploit the strategic
e¤ect and both must insure their retailer at least partially by keeping wholesale price above
marginal cost. In other words, the above e¤ects play for both manufacturers and, as a result,
the equilibrium retail prices must unambiguously increase as well.
Part (b) of the proposition indicates that there is some possible ambiguity about the
change in expected retail prices when one manufacturer already has ET and the other one
switches from no ET to ET. This is the case at least with signi…cant uncertainty about
the barrier to trade. The ambiguity does not come from the retail price response for the
13good produced by the manufacturer with ET. In e¤ect, with the switch in contracts by his
rival, this manufacturer can now exploit a strategic e¤ect which, ceteris paribus, increases
his wholesale and retail prices (compare (10) and (8)). Rather the ambiguity comes from the
price response of the manufacturer who adopts ET. With uncertainty about t,t h es w i t c h
to ET introduces an insurance e¤ect (which, ceteris paribus, would lead to a higher retail
price), but it also decreases the strategic e¤ect (which tends to reduce the retail price).
This reduction in the strategic e¤ect may or may not be o¤set by the insurance e¤ect. If
the retailers were risk-neutral, the strategic e¤ect would not be a¤ected by the change in
contract. Hence a su¢cient condition for the equilibrium retail prices to increase is that the
degree of uncertainty is small.
4 The Equilibrium Choice of Contracts
Having characterized the equilibrium wholesale and retail prices for the four possible contract
combinations, we now turn to the …rst stage of the game, namely the manufacturers’ choice


























f ,a n ds oo n .
4.1 Two polar cases
Whether a given contract constitutes a best response (or even a dominant strategy) depends
on a trade-o¤ between the insurance property of the contract and its e¤ect on interbrand
competition. As we have shown above, the use of ET tends to reduce competition (i.e. in-
crease retail prices). However, since this contract has inferior insurance properties relative to
14‘no ET’, a manufacturer uses ET only when the gain from decreased interbrand competition
outweighs the risk premium that he has to ‘pay’ the risk-averse retailer. Before examining
this trade-o¤ in more detail it is useful to …rst look at two extreme situations, one in which
there is no uncertainty about t, and another in which there is no interbrand competition.
Proposition 2 If there is no uncertainty about trade barriers, barriers are non-prohibitive,
and goods are substitutes, each manufacturer’s dominant strategy is to choose ET.
This result is a corollary of Proposition 3 in Rey and Stiglitz (1995) and easily proved
using the arguments laid out in the previous section. By adopting ET a manufacturer frees
up the retail price from his wholesale price thereby allowing his rival to exploit a strategic
e¤ect. In particular, the rival will choose a higher wholesale price, since he now realizes
that the associated increase in his good’s retail price will be accompanied by an increase in
the other good’s retail price. Hence adopting ET leads to more collusion and is desirable
whether or not the rival himself has adopted ET.
Proposition 3 If trade barriers are uncertain and the degree of product substitutability is
su¢ciently small, ‘no ET’ is a dominant strategy for each manufacturer. Moreover, indepen-
dent of the degree of product substitutability, ‘no ET’ is a dominant strategy for the domestic
manufacturer, if the expected barrier to trade is su¢ciently close to the prohibitive level.
The …rst part of this proposition is a corollary of Rey and Tirole (1986)’s Proposition
2, where the result is proved for the case where the degree of substitutability is zero. By
continuity, the result also holds for a su¢ciently small degree of substitutability. When
products are poor substitutes, …rms do not have to worry about rivalry but only about the
insurance property of the contract. Under ‘no ET’, retailers are fully insured against risk
since they earn zero pro…t in any state of nature. The second part of Proposition 3 follows
from the …rst. When the expected level of the trade barrier is high, the domestic …rm again
faces little price competition, and thus chooses ‘no ET’ to insure its retailers.
The preceding arguments point to three factors that in‡uence the trade-o¤ between re-
ducing competition and providing insurance, and hence determine the choice of contract.
15They include the degree of product substitutability, the degree of uncertainty of trade bar-
riers, and the expected level of these barriers. To identify the role of each of these factors
we need to assign parameters to them.
4.2 A parameterized model
Assume that demand takes the following form:
D
i(pi;p j)=1¡ pi + bpj: (12)
Parameter b re‡ects the degree of product substitutability. If b =0 , then the products are
not substitutable and each producer acts as a monopolist; when b =1 ; demand depends only
on the price di¤erence.
Further assume that ci =0for i = h;f,a n dt h a tt is distributed over the interval
[te ¡ v;te + v]. Parameter v then measures the ‘degree of uncertainty’ about t,w h e r e a s
te allows us to track changes in the expected level of trade barriers, keeping the degree of
uncertainty constant. To compute welfare, we make the additional assumption that t is
uniformly distributed; in this case, the variance of t, ¾2
t,i se q u a lt ov2
3 .
From the discussion in the previous section it is clear that, given uncertain trade barriers,
both manufacturers will adopt ‘no ET’ for su¢ciently low values of b,a n db o t hw i l lc h o o s e
ET for values of b close enough to one, unless v and/or te are very high. Hence, the most
interesting trade-o¤s in the choice of contract occur for intermediate values of b. This is the
case we focus on below.
Figure 1 shows the equilibrium contracts that arise for di¤erent values of te and v for
b =0 :8.15 When v is small, the risk premium manufacturers have to pay their exclusive
retailers is small and both adopt ET in order to reduce price competition. When v is
large relative to te, the risk premium is big and both manufacturers choose ‘no ET’, despite
15All …gures in this paper were generated with Maple using the parameterized model described above, and
a grid of at least 95 values each for te and v. We consider only values such that te ¸ v to make sure that
trade barriers are non-negative for all realizations of t.
16substantial price competition. Finally when te and v a r eb o t hs u b s t a n t i a l ,t h ed o m e s t i c
manufacturer faces little price competition and hence chooses ‘no ET’ to insure his retailers.
Interestingly, however, the foreign manufacturer’s best response is to adopt ET: the high
level of the trade barrier reduces the variation in his retailer’s pro…t margin, thus helping
to insure him. This allows the foreign manufacturer to adopt ET to limit price competition
with the domestic rival.
[Insert Figure 1 about here]
Figure 1 con…rms that changes in both the expected level of trade barriers (keeping v
…xed and changing te) and the degree of transparency (holding te …xed and changing v)
may lead to a shift in equilibrium manufacturer-retailer contracts. These shifts give rise to
discrete changes in wholesale and retail prices, as stated in Proposition 1. Price changes,
in turn, have consequences for the volume of trade, consumer surplus, pro…ts and welfare.
These consequences are explored in the next section.
5 The E¤ects of Trade Liberalization
We consider two trade liberalization scenarios, a cut in the level of the trade barrier and a
decrease in the degree of uncertainty of the trade barrier, assuming that b =0 :8 so that the
equilibrium contracts are given by Figure 1. Consider the e¤ects of a decrease in the level
…rst, that is, the e¤ects of reducing te holding v constant. Holding contracts …xed, cutting te
leads to increased price competition between the manufacturers; this is, of course, a standard
result in the literature on imperfect competition in trade [see, for instance, Helpman and
Krugman (1989)]. But as Figure 1 shows, a reduction in te eventually leads to a switch in
contract by at least one manufacturer.16
When v (and hence the risk premium an exclusive agent would have to be paid) is
small, the domestic manufacturer eventually reacts to the decrease in te by adopting ET
16In Figure 1 it is possible to have a switch from (N;E) to (E;E) and then to (N;N).
17while the foreign manufacturer keeps ET. As we know from Proposition 1, this change in
contract causes a jump in equilibrium retail prices when v is small. Hence, at this switch,
manufacturers are replacing trade barriers with private anticompetitive arrangements. We
have thus identi…ed circumstances under which the suspicions of antitrust authorities we
mentioned in the introduction prove to be correct. However, we can also identify a situation
in which trade liberalization prompts manufacturers to abandon private anticompetitive
arrangements. When v is high, it is the foreign manufacturer who moves from ET to ‘no
ET’, whereas the domestic manufacturer retains ‘no ET’: as te falls, the retailer carrying the
foreign product faces a greater variability in pro…t and, since v is high, has to be insured by
changing the contract to ‘no ET’. In this case, Proposition 1 tells us that equilibrium retail
prices drop at the point where the switch occurs. Trade liberalization in this case boosts
competition in two ways, namely by the traditional e¤ect of forcing retailers to lower price,
and by inducing manufacturers to stop using ET.
Similar switches in contracts can be generated by decreasing the degree of uncertainty
of the trade barrier (i.e., by reducing v holding te constant). Since such a reduction directly
reduces the need to insure retailers, both manufacturers eventually adopt ET.
Next, we turn to the impact of theses contract changes on expected domestic welfare. To
examine this impact we must explicitly de…ne the preferences of a representative domestic
consumer that we had previously only characterized by his demand functions (12). Assume
that they are given by the following quasi-linear utility function:
U(xi;x j;y)=
1+b














1 ¡ b2xixj + y; (13)
where xi denotes the consumption of manufacturer i’s product, y the consumption of the
numeraire good, and b ¸ 0. Denoting income by m, the consumer’s budget constraint is
pixi + pjxj + y = m: (14)
It is easily veri…ed that maximizing (13) subject to (14) and inverting the resulting …rst-order
conditions yields the demand functions in (12).
18We de…ne domestic welfare in an ex-ante sense as the (risk-neutral) representative con-
sumer’s expected utility, assuming that his expected income, m, consists of the expected
pro…ts that he obtains from the domestic …rms. When looking at ex-ante social welfare,
it is important to make sure that the …rms’ participation constraints are satis…ed [see, for
instance, Mas-Colell, Whinston and Green (1995), ch. 23, for a discussion]. This means that
ex ante the representative consumer is not able to collect more than the pro…ts the …rms
themselves expect to receive. He therefore obtains the risk-neutral domestic manufacturer’s
total expected pro…t, but only zero pro…t from the risk-averse retailers.17
Trade liberalization a¤ects expected welfare in two ways. First, holding contracts …xed, a
decrease in te reduces equilibrium prices. This lowers the domestic manufacturer’s expected
pro…t but increases expected consumer surplus. Except when the trade barrier is close to
the prohibitive level, the consumer-surplus e¤ect dominates and a reduction in trade barriers
raises expected domestic welfare. This is again a standard result in the literature on imperfect
competition in trade [see, for instance, Helpman and Krugman (1989)], and we do not dwell
on it. Second, reducing te even in…nitesimally may lead to a switch in contract and hence to
a discrete change in welfare. This change in welfare comes from two sources: the changes in
equilibrium prices a¤ecting both the domestic manufacturer’s pro…t and consumer surplus,
and from the change in the variance term in consumer surplus.18
The discrete jumps in expected domestic welfare that occur when the equilibrium con-
tracts change are illustrated in Figure 2, which plots welfare as a function of te and v for
b =0 :8. Figure 2 indicates that moving from (N;E) to (N;N) l e a d st oad i s c r e t ei m -
provement in expected welfare. When trade liberalization instead leads to (E;E),t h e r ei s
17Under ET manufacturers set their franchise fees so as to extract the pro…ts obtained by retailers under
the ‘worst’ realization of t; so retailers expect to receive zero pro…ts. However, since the probability that t
takes on this value is in…nitely small, retailers earn pure pro…ts ex post. Our formulation of ex-ante social
welfare is also in line with the Industrial Organization literature [see Rey and Tirole (1986)]. For further
details on ex-ante and ex-post welfare see Holmstrom and Myerson (1983).
18Even though the representative consumer is risk neutral, expected consumer surplus depends on the
variance of t; ¾2
t. With linear demands, consumer surplus is increasing in ¾2
t; but the coe¢cient associated
with ¾2
t is speci…c to each combination of contracts.
19a discrete drop in expected welfare. The …gure also indicates that the e¤ects on expected
domestic welfare of changes in contracts may be quite large compared to the e¤ects of even
signi…cant trade liberalization; this is re‡ected by the fact that the surfaces for any given
contract combination are relatively ‡at, whereas the discrete jumps when contract changes
occur are relatively big.19 For instance, it can be shown that for v =0 :2 the fall in expected
welfare that occurs when the domestic …rm switches from ‘no ET’ to ET is so large that
even complete trade liberalization cannot o¤set the associated expected welfare loss.
[Insert Figure 2 about here]
Figures 3 and 4 plot expected world welfare (de…ned as expected domestic welfare plus
the foreign manufacturer’s expected pro…t) and the expected trade volume, respectively. In
these two …gures the surfaces for any given contract equilibrium are signi…cantly steeper
and the jumps where contract changes occur smaller than in Figure 2. Although, according
to Figure 3, abandoning ET can still lead to sizeable gains in world welfare, big gains can
now also be achieved through trade liberalization. The reason for this is evident in Figure
4. This …gure indicates that, although the volume of trade decreases when one or both
manufacturers switch to ET, the choice of contracts has comparatively small e¤ects on the
volume of trade compared to a reduction in te.
[Insert Figures 3 and 4 about here]
What does this imply for the potential role of competition policy? It is apparent that in
the scenario illustrated in Figure 2 (b =0 :8) the biggest improvement in domestic welfare
that can be achieved comes less from trade liberalization per se than from manufacturers
abandoning ET. Trade liberalization induces them to do so when v is high, but not when
v is low. In this last case, there is a clear role for a competition policy prohibiting ET.
However, insofar as our simulations show world welfare to be much less sensitive to switches
19The shape and spacing of the iso-welfare contours indicate, for instance, that the region with (E;E) has
a steeper gradient than the region with (N;E).
20in contracts and much more sensitive to trade liberalization than domestic welfare, the need
for competition policy is essentially a national one. Hence, in the scenario examined in this
paper, there does not seem to be a need for global rules concerning the use of ET. However, at
the national level, competition policy and trade liberalization may be complements especially
in an environment where barriers to trade are relatively transparent.
6E x t e n s i o n s
In this section, we examine how the results or our model would be a¤ected by changes in
the underlying assumptions. One of these assumptions is that there is no retailing cost.
This made sure that manufacturers want to use a franchise fee along with ET. As shown
by Gal-Or (1991), this is no longer the case in the presence of …xed retailing cost. In this
case, linear pricing with ET may be the only equilibrium especially when products are close
substitutes and retailing costs are high. The advantage of linear pricing is that it represents
an even greater commitment to raise prices than using a franchise fee, and this is especially
pro…table when products are close substitutes. The disadvantage is that it is more di¢cult
for manufacturers to capture the retailer’s pro…t than when a franchise fee is used, but the
foregone pro…t is low when the retailing cost is high. Of course, …xed retailing cost are not
consistent with marginal-cost pricing under ‘no ET’. Insofar as the same conclusion holds
with variable retailing costs (as claimed by Gal-Or) or by a combination of both types of
retailing costs giving rise to U-shaped average retailing cost curves, it indicates that ET and
the anti-competitive e¤ect it brings cannot be expected to be systematically associated with
franchise fee payments between retailers and manufacturers.
It might be argued that the domestic manufacturer should have a better knowledge of
the barrier to trade than the foreign manufacturer. Given the nature of the barrier, it
is probably extreme to assume it would know about it at the same time as the retailers.
Still, this constitutes a useful benchmark. In this case, the contract between a domestic
manufacturer and its retailers can be made conditional on the realization of t. The domestic
21manufacturer has little need for competition as it can now insure its retailers while granting
them exclusive territory. In other words, ET becomes a dominant strategy for the domestic
manufacturer. From Proposition 1 we know that the foreign manufacturer bene…ts from
ET set by the domestic manufacturer, and he might therefore place more weight on the
insurance motive. We can thus expect the foreign manufacturer to use ‘no ET’ for a wider
set of parameters than when both manufacturers do not know t. An equilibrium with (E;N)
should then also be observed for a larger parameter range. However, as te falls we should
still observe a switch to (E;E) when v is small.
Finally, we have concentrated our attention on ET ignoring other forms of contractual
arrangements between manufacturers and retailers. In particular, manufacturers may want
to consider deeper vertical integration with retailers. It is clear, however, that merging with a
retailer does not constitute a dominant strategy for the manufacturers when the alternatives
are contractual arrangements with ET or with ‘no ET’. The main bene…t of ‘no ET’ is to
insure retailers. With a merger, the risk is supported by the merging …rm and thus in part
by the risk-averse retailer. Unless speci…c contractual arrangements among merging parties
are set to shift the risk toward the production unit of the merging entity, merging as a
joint-pro…t maximization mechanism cannot completely insure the retailer. Similarly, ET
helps decrease intrabrand competition precisely because the retailer plays a key role as an
independent intermediary. A merger produces the opposite result: it eliminates the retailer
as an intermediary and the merging …rm simply sets a retail price. There is thus more
competition among the two manufacturers once they have merged with their retailers than
if they do not merge and use ET. This suggests that merger, as an alternative contractual
arrangement, would not dominate the contracts analyzed in this paper.
7 Conclusions
In this paper, manufacturers pursue two objectives: they want to insure their risk-averse re-
tailers against the e¤ects of uncertain barriers to trade, and they want to minimize interbrand
22competition. The …rst objective can be accomplished by creating intrabrand competition be-
tween retailers. The second objective can be achieved by the use of exclusive territories. This
creates a trade-o¤: while exclusive territory clauses are very e¢cient at decreasing interbrand
competition, they have poor insurance properties. Uncertain trade barriers directly a¤ect
the foreign manufacturer. But they also have an indirect e¤ect on the domestic manufacturer
via interbrand competition between retailers. Hence the domestic manufacturer, too, faces
a trade-o¤ in his use of exclusive territories.
In this setting, trade liberalization tends to make exclusive territories more attractive
to manufacturers if domestic and foreign products are relatively good substitutes and the
degree of trade uncertainty is not too high. The consequence is immediate: welfare, and even
imports, may decrease with trade liberalization as the mechanism just described induces
manufacturers to replace trade barriers with private anti-competitive arrangements. On the
other hand, if domestic and foreign products are relatively poor substitutes and/or trade
uncertainty is high, trade liberalization will tend to reduce the use of exclusive territories. In
this case, the switch in contracts to retailer competition gives an additional boost to trade
volume and welfare.
We conclude that, in this model, a concern expressed by anti-trust authorities in the
United States and Europe is at least partly justi…ed: trade liberalization may induce manu-
facturers to use private anti-competitive arrangements, such as exclusive territories. Hence,
if anything, competition policy limiting the use of such a clause must be stronger, not weaker,
with economic integration. However, the results of this paper also suggest that such a com-
petition policy cannot be applied as a per se rule. Indeed, the e¤ects of lower barriers to
trade depend to a large extent on their initial level, on their degree of transparency, and on
the degree of substitutability between foreign and domestic products. For instance, there is
no need to be tougher on exclusive territory clauses when products are highly di¤erentiated
or when products are similar but barrier to trade are relatively uncertain. A tougher com-
petition policy, however, becomes desirable when foreign and domestic products are similar
and the initial barrier to trade is high and relatively transparent.
23There are, of course, many possible channels through which …rms might react to attenuate
the e¤ects of trade liberalization. In this paper, we have claimed that contractual arrange-
ments should be considered as an important candidate. By inducing manufacturers to switch
to an exclusive-territory clause when barriers to trade decrease or become more transparent,
our approach may contribute to explaining why the e¤ects of the EU’s 1992 Single Market
Initiative have been more modest than expected, or why o¢cial e¤orts to improve market
access in Japan had somewhat disappointing results. Still, this paper represents only a …rst
step and much further research, both at the theoretical and at the empirical level, is needed
to gain a better understanding of the role of contractual arrangements in international trade.
8 Appendix 1: Examples of Uncertain Barriers to Trade
8.1 Japan:
Aluminum Baseball Bats (Prestowitz (1988), p96-99): To sell a baseball bat, the Japanese
league required producers to have an o¢cial league seal imprinted on the bat. It took 3
years for two US producers, Rawlings and Easton, to obtain the seal. The league then
required the use of an aluminum alloy not used in the United States. After a complaint
to GATT, the requirement was dropped, but bats still had to satisfy a safety standard. To
check whether the standard was met, MITI required inspection of the U.S. factory. However,
the ministry did not have enough travel money to send inspectors abroad and Japan could
not accept third-party inspection. It was then decided that each lot of bats shipped from
the United States would have to be inspected before receiving the safety mark. Ultimately,
Japan relaxed its law on safety standards. Four years later, the two US …rms still had less
than 1% of the market.
New varieties of horticultural products must undergo costly and time-consuming addi-
tional scienti…c and testing according to phytosanitary protocols. Fresh horticultural prod-
ucts must go through inspection at the exporting country production site by Japanese in-
spectors. Fumigation takes place as soon as a shipment is found to be infested with live
24insects regardless of whether such pests are already present in Japan (USTR (1998)).
Import clearance procedures are slow by OECD standards. A new Additional Tax Law
(1997) is slowing down custom processing and speci…es administrative punishments for mis-
takes, clerical or otherwise (USTR (1998)).
The government delegates public policy functions, such as industry standards develop-
ment, product certi…cations and entry authorizations, to industry associations and other
business-related organizations. These organizations are under no obligation to conduct their
operations in an open, transparent and non-discriminatory manner or to include foreign …rms
in their deliberations (USTR (1998)).
8.2 Korea: (all from USTR (1998))
Import clearance for non-perishable agricultural products typically takes two to four weeks
and sometimes up to two months. There exist mandatory incubating testing for some prod-
ucts including Florida fruits. The law requires labels to include manufacturing process
information and ingredient listed by percentage for all ingredients. It also requires labeling
on imported products to show the import price in Korean Won, which has to be updated
every three months to account for exchange rate ‡uctuations.
Arbitrary and sudden changes in custom classi…cation and border treatment (i.e., the tar-
i¤ level) are often reported. Custom clearance applications can be rejected on administrative
grounds.
Korea requires pre-approval for cosmetics, food additives, pharmaceuticals, chemicals,
electronics, and personal communication services. It requires annual testing of cosmetic
products and batch testing for each shipment, including animal testing.
Pharmaceutical companies report that for products developed outside Korea …nal-step
clinical trials cannot be started in Korea before they are completed in another country.
There is then a 145 days delay in registration before those trials can begin, thus delaying
introduction of new foreign products by two years.
In the auto industry, the reclassi…cation of minivans has increased taxes (1995). There
25is redundant vehicle testing beyond the initial type-approval certi…cation process. Korea
blends international certi…cation standards making it impossible for importers to homologate
vehicles without incurring cost to modify and test vehicles for export to Korea.
All radio and television advertising must be submitted in its …nal fully produced form for
censorship. Given the unpredictability of the process, this adds considerable risk and cost
of introducing new products.
8.3 United States:
In April 1999, Canada accused the US of illegally manipulating international customs rules
to thwart Canadian lumber exports by reclassifying siding boards so that they fall under the
quotas set in the 1996 Canada-US lumber agreement. Siding is the third major category of
Canadian lumber to face reclassi…cation in the past year. The US successfully reclassi…ed
pre-drilled studs and is proposing doing the same with notched studs (Globe and Mail
(1999)).
On Jan 4, 1989, the Custom Service announced that jeeps and vans were re-classi…ed
as trucks increasing the tari¤ rate from 2.5% to 25% e¤ective immediately. The Treasury
Department then modi…ed the change in classi…cation by announcing that two-door vehicles
were trucks but four-door sport vehicles and jeeps were automobiles (Bovard (1991)).
On Dec. 6, 1988, Customs announced that steel wire rope with beckets was re-classi…ed
from an uncontrolled tari¤ category to a tari¤ classi…cation restricted by a Voluntary Re-
straint Agreements signed a few years earlier (Bovard (1991)).
On July 2, 1987, Customs announced a retroactive 2,500% tari¤ increase on computer
parts (Bovard (1991)).
In 1988, Customs increased the tari¤ levied on a shipment of 33,000 girl’s ski jackets from
10.6% to 35% because the jackets had small strips of corduroy on the sleeves amounting to
2% of the jacket’s composition (Bovard (1991)).
In 1988, Customs prohibited the imports of a shipment of 30,000 tennis shoes from
Indonesia, because the shoe boxes contained an extra pair of shoelaces (Bovard (1991)).
268.4 European Union:
In February 1988, the EC changed its requirement for a product to qualify as being ‘Euro-
pean’. Concerning integrated circuits, the EC changed its rule of origin by rede…ning the
term ‘place of last substantial transformation’ from ‘place of assembly and testing’ to ‘place
of di¤usion’ (i.e., the state at which circuits are placed on a semiconductor wafer) (USTR
(1989)).
New standards for sterile medical devices and diagnostic products in Germany requires
storage of pharmaceutical …le samples at the importer’s site rather than the exporting com-
pany (USTR (1989)).
In 1982, France decreed that all VCRs imported from Japan must pass through the
(completely overworked) customs o¢ce in Poitiers (Krugman and Obstfeld, 1997).
9 Appendix 2
We …rst show that under ET retail prices are strategic complements, i.e., that retailers’ best-
reply functions are upward sloping. Retailer i’s best-reply function is given by (3). Using
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Also note that dpi=dpj < 1:
Next we demonstrate that, under ET, @pi=@wi < 1, which means that retailer i absorbs
part of any increase in the wholesale price (or ti). Totally di¤erentiating the system of
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which holds given the assumptions about demand.
10 Appendix 3: Proof of Proposition 1
(a) If manufacturers i and j have ‘no ET’, wholesale prices are given by (11). Note that














Suppose that j switches to ET. Wholesale prices are then given by (9) and (10). Using
wi = pi ¡ te






















Since the strategic e¤ect in (20) is positive, j’s switch to ET means that for any wj manu-
facturer i chooses a higher wi, thereby driving up pi.
Now …x wi and consider what wj w o u l dh a v et ob et ok e e ppj unchanged when j adopts
ET. Under ET, pj is determined by retailer j’s …rst-order condition (3). Comparing (3) and
28(19) we …nd that holding pj …xed would require that wj = cj: However, manufacturer j’s
…rst-order condition under ET, (10), indicates that his best response to wi involves wj >c j;
since under risk aversion Dj(te) ¡ Dj(tv
j) > 0. Hence for any given wi;j ’s choice of wj
implies that pj is higher than under ‘no ET’. We conclude from this and the argument in
the previous paragraph that if j adopts ET both pi and pj go up.
Next consider what happens if i and j both introduce ET so that equation system (8)
determines wholesale prices. Using the same reasoning as in the preceding paragraph, we
can establish that the only way to keep retail prices unchanged when there is a switch from
‘no ET’ to ET is for both manufacturers to set wholesale price equal to marginal cost,
wi = ci for i = h;f. But since Di(te) ¡ Di(tv
i) > 0 and the strategic e¤ect in (8) is positive,
manufacturers will choose wi >c i, thereby raising retail prices. This establishes part (a).
(b) If j has ET but i does not, wholesale prices are given by (9) and (10). Consider
what happens if i adopts ET so that wholesale prices are given by (8). To keep retail price
pj constant for a given wi, j would have to continue setting wj according to (10). But a
comparison of (10) and (8) shows that j wants to raise wj due to the positive strategic e¤ect
in (8), and hence pj must rise for any given wi.S i n c edpi=dpj > 0 under ET, this e¤ect tends
to raise pi as well.
Next take wj as given and consider how wi would have to change to keep pi constant
when i adopts ET. Under ‘no ET’ pi(te
i)=wi ¡ te
i and @pi(te)=@wi =1 ; using this in (9) we
























Under ET, i’s retailer chooses pi according to (3); and to achieve the same expected markup,
(pi(te
i) ¡ ci ¡ te

















This equation di¤ers from (8) due to the fact that te 6= tv
i: First, (8) contains the insurance
e¤ect, Di(te) ¡ Di(tv
i); which is positive and hence suggests that pi should be higher than






















































This condition, however, is not always satis…ed. Under linear demand, for instance, the









But we can verify that this inequality does not hold for either the domestic or the foreign
…rm. The domestic …rm does not face any trade barrier, so (25) simpli…es to ph(t¡) >p h(te),
which is a contradiction. For the foreign …rm we note that, since @pf(¢)=@t = @pf(¢)=@wf < 1
(see Appendix 2) and t+ >t e, pf(t+) ¡ t+ >p f(te) ¡ te
f is also a contradiction.
Since all e¤ects other than the change in the strategic e¤ect imply an increase in retail
prices as i shifts to ET, a su¢cient condition for such an increase is that jtv
i ¡ te
ij is small.
This proves part (b).
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